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ENGAGED CLIENT-CENTERED 
REPRESENTATION AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAWYER-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
Katherine R. Kruse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thank you for inviting me here to speak with you today about 
engaged client-centered representation. I am going to talk about the 
continuities and discontinuities between the way lawyers and clients are 
viewed in the two worlds in which I live: the world of legal ethics 
scholarship and the world of clinical legal education. It is fitting that I 
get the opportunity to have this conversation at Hofstra, because Hofstra 
is a place with a rich tradition and history in both areas. 
I begin with a story that goes back to the beginning of legal ethics 
as we know it today: before the ABA promulgated the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct; before Professional Responsibility courses were 
required in law schools; before states required mandatory CLE credits in 
ethics; and before legal scholars wrote systematically about the 
relationship between lawyers’ duties and lawyers’ roles in society and in 
our system of justice. Before that whole substructure of legal ethics 
analysis had been constructed, lawyers worked out the details of their 
professional responsibilities to clients and to the public in conversation 
with other lawyers engaged in the same kind of practice, trying to figure 
out together what it meant to be good lawyers. 
The story is about the consequences of a conversation among 
lawyers about their professional responsibilities.1 In the early 1960s, a 
 * Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law 
School. This speech was given as the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics 
Lecture, Hofstra Law School, October 6, 2010.  
 1. The details of this story are drawn from Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About 
Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 136-39 (2008). 
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group of criminal defense lawyers got together regularly to talk through 
tactical questions about how to do their jobs faithfully and well. In one 
of their meetings, the subject of client perjury came up. One of the 
members of the group confessed a problem to which she had no good 
solution: her client was going to testify at trial, she thought the client 
was going to lie, and she did not know what she was supposed to do 
about it. The group realized that this was a difficult question that they 
had each faced at one time or another, and that they had faced it largely 
alone. It was not the kind of question they had wanted to talk about out 
loud and in public. As they talked through the issue, they realized that 
the Canons of Professional Responsibility were inconsistent with respect 
to the duties of confidentiality toward clients and candor toward the 
courts, and that there were different ways to resolve the inconsistency. 
So, they came up with a variety of different answers or strategies for 
dealing with the situation. 
These were also the early days of Gideon v. Wainwright,2 when the 
constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases had just been 
established.3 One of the young lawyers who had been part of this 
discussion group had started an institute to train lawyers in criminal 
defense work. In a training session at that institute, he presented the 
question of what a lawyer should do when faced with potential client 
perjury, laid out a variety of possible resolutions, and defended the idea 
that if efforts to dissuade the client from testifying falsely failed, it was 
consistent with a lawyer’s ethical duties to maintain confidentiality and 
present the client’s testimony anyway. The lecture was reported in the 
press; the next day, he was served with notice of disbarment proceedings 
for even suggesting such a thing out loud and in public. In defending 
himself against these ethical charges, that lawyer wrote a law review 
article laying out the rationale for his answer and showing that he was 
not just fomenting disrespect for the law or disrespect for the courts, but 
that he was advancing a thoughtful answer to a difficult question that 
was grounded in lawyers’ professional roles and duties. 
As many of you probably know, that young man was Monroe 
Freedman, and his article, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal 
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions,4 along with his later 
book, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System,5 were among the first 
thoughtful, comprehensive descriptions of what it means for a lawyer to 
 2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 3. Id. at 338-39, 344. 
 4. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). 
 5. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). 
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zealously represent a client within the bounds of the law and how central 
that concept is to our societal notions of fairness, dignity, autonomy, and 
justice. Freedman argued in that work and elsewhere that at the very 
heart of this comprehensive vision of zealous advocacy within the 
bounds of the law, there is a relationship—the lawyer-client 
relationship.6 And, that relationship is a very human relationship built on 
a foundation of loyalty by the lawyer and trust by the client. Freedman 
argued then, as he has continued to argue vigorously over the years, that 
if we have ethical rules that require lawyers to betray their clients, it will 
destroy the loyalty and trust in the lawyer-client relationship, make it 
impossible for lawyers to perform their adversary function properly, and 
undermine the foundation of our system of justice.7 
The field of legal ethics, as we know it today, has grown out of 
thoughtful, systematic grounding of lawyers’ duties in a comprehensive 
understanding of lawyers’ roles and the situating of lawyers’ roles in 
underlying theories of law, morality, and justice. Unfortunately, in the 
process, the field of theoretical legal ethics has mostly lost track of the 
thing that Freedman insisted was at the heart of a lawyers’ role: the 
integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. As I will discuss, the field of 
theoretical legal ethics has developed in ways that are deeply lawyer-
centered rather than fundamentally client-centered. I am going to speak 
about how that happened. I am also going to share some of my ideas 
about what it would mean to ground a fundamentally client-centered 
conception of lawyers’ duties to represent a client zealously within the 
bounds of the law in moral, political, and jurisprudential theory. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL LAWYER-CENTERED APPROACH TO LEGAL 
ETHICS 
By the mid-1970s, theoretical interest in legal ethics was on the 
rise. But many of the people who were thinking and writing in the new 
field did not begin their careers as legal ethicists the way Monroe 
Freedman did: by talking to other lawyers about what it means to be a 
good lawyer and grounding the insight of that experience in theory. 
Instead, they approached legal ethics as philosophers exploring what 
David Luban called the “hard, unsolved . . . issues in legal ethics that are 
amenable to treatment by moral philosophy.”8 From the perspective of 
 6. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 68-70, 
128-29 (4th ed. 2010); Freedman, supra note 4, at 1470. 
 7. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 128, 137-39; Freedman, supra note 4, at 1470, 
1473, 1475. 
 8. David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal 
Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981). 
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philosophers, the interesting questions in legal ethics arose from 
conflicts between the demands of lawyers’ professional roles and 
ordinary morality.9 The theoretically interesting questions centered on, 
in the words of Charles Fried: “Can a good lawyer be a good person?”10 
To frame the important and interesting questions of legal ethics in 
terms of conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality, moral 
philosophers had to define lawyers’ role morality in a way that would 
create conflicts between moral responsibility and professional duty. 
According to the moral philosophers, lawyers occupy a simplified and 
morally problematic universe in which their decisionmaking was 
determined according to only two parameters: client objectives and the 
bounds of the law.11 I am going to argue later that an engaged client-
centered approach to pursuing a client’s objectives within the bounds of 
the law is not at all simplified and much less morally problematic than 
the moral philosophers in legal ethics have painted it to be. But first, I 
need to better explain the philosophers’ critique of traditional legal 
ethics. 
To create philosophically interesting conflicts between role 
morality and ordinary morality, the moral philosophers in legal ethics 
had to define the parameters of professional duty—client objectives and 
the bounds of the law—in a particular and simplistic way. The bounds of 
the law were understood within the moral philosophical critique as 
allowing lawyers to do whatever they wanted to do, as long as they 
could find a way to justify it with legal arguments. With respect to the 
bounds of the law, moral philosophers pointed out that lawyers did not 
typically engage in good faith interpretation of the meaning of legal 
limits.12 Instead, lawyers engaged in a kind of linguistic gamesmanship 
that stretched the meaning of law well past its intended purposes.13 And 
this expansive conception of the bounds of the law, which included any 
colorable interpretation of law that lawyers could argue with a straight 
face, was insufficient to contain over-zealous partisan tactics.14 
As it turns out, the territory out at the colorable limits of the law is 
fertile ground for the kinds of conflicts between role morality and 
ordinary morality that the moral philosophers wanted to explore 
 9. Id. at 454-56. 
 10. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976). 
 11. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 
73-74 (1980). 
 12. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
103, 111 (2010). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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theoretically. When you push the limits of the law out past its intended 
purposes, a lot of things are legally permissible, and not all of them are 
morally right. But the moral philosophers could not get lawyers out to 
the colorable limits of the law on their own steam. Lawyers’ professional 
duties are to pursue their clients’ objectives, and if their clients want 
things that most law-abiding people want, then lawyers do not have 
occasion to push out to the colorable limits of the law. To create 
dilemmas between role morality and ordinary morality, the moral 
philosophers also had to posit clients who wanted to use the law to 
maximize their own wealth, freedom, and power over others. 
The examples that moral philosophers gave of lawyers’ moral 
dilemmas took on a predictable structure: they involved clients who 
wanted to do the wrong thing and harm innocent third parties but whose 
actions nonetheless fell within the arguable bounds of the law. For 
example, a man owes a debt, but his creditor has waited too long to 
collect it, so the man has an arguable statute of limitations defense to 
defeat his moral obligation to repay his creditor.15 Or, a man wants to 
disinherit his son because he disagrees with his son’s opposition to the 
Vietnam War.16 Some of these examples came from actual cases. One 
particularly well-worn example arose from the facts in the 1962 case 
Spaulding v. Zimmerman,17 in which the defendant in a personal injury 
case discovered through a medical examination of the plaintiff that the 
plaintiff was suffering from a life-threatening aortic aneurysm, but the 
law did not compel the defense to turn over the results of that medical 
examination, and the defendant settled the case without ever advising the 
plaintiff that his life was in danger.18 
You may already be familiar with these examples or examples like 
them, because they are the kinds of examples you have probably 
encountered in your professional responsibility classes. Now, if you 
were a particularly bold student in your professional responsibility class, 
you might have asked, when confronted with an example like the one in 
Spaulding: Why doesn’t the lawyer just ask the client if the client is 
willing to reveal the damaging medical information to help save the 
plaintiff’s life?19 But a question like that threatens to do away with the 
conflict between role morality and ordinary morality that the example is 
 15. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 11, at 66. 
 16. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 7 
(1975). 
 17. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
 18. Id. at 707-08, 710. 
 19. This point has consistently been made over time by Monroe Freedman. See Monroe H. 
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 200-01 
(1978). 
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meant to illustrate. It diverts the discussion away from the lawyer’s 
moral dilemma and onto the question of what kind of discussion is 
appropriate for the lawyer and the client to have about whether to reveal 
the information. To get the discussion back to the main point—the 
lawyer’s moral dilemma—you were probably told to assume that the 
client will not agree to reveal the information. 
To focus on the lawyers’ moral dilemma, clients had to be 
constructed as what I have elsewhere called “‘cardboard clients,’” who 
care only about the advancement of their own interests and are 
unconcerned with the harm caused to others.20 As you can see, the 
lawyers in these examples are assumed to be basically good people. 
They want to lead moral lives and to do the right thing. They do not 
want to harm other people. They are not in it for the money. People like 
that can be trusted to make good moral decisions, and if they were not 
required to abide by their clients’ wishes, they would probably make 
good moral decisions about their clients’ lives and affairs. The problem 
is not with the lawyers themselves, but with the professional duty to 
pursue the client’s objectives up to the limits of the law. Because the law 
does not require clients to do the right thing, because clients have no 
incentive to do the right thing on their own, and because lawyers are 
duty-bound to press their clients’ objectives all the way to the arguable 
limits of the law, there must be something rotten at the very core of legal 
ethics. To fulfill your professional duty to be a good lawyer, you have to 
be a morally bad person. 
The solution that the moral philosophers arrived at was that we 
should hold lawyers morally responsible for the actions they take as 
lawyers.21 They argued that re-introducing ordinary moral responsibility 
and judgment into professional decisionmaking would remove the 
professional obligation to do the wrong thing in the name of professional 
role and encourage lawyers to set limits on their legal representation that 
seem right to them, based on their own moral compasses.22 If legal 
representation were shaped by the moral judgment of lawyers rather than 
the partisan duty to clients, it would prevent harm from coming to 
innocent third parties. And it would permit lawyers to integrate their 
duties as good lawyers into their ordinary moral lives as good persons.23 
 20. Kruse, supra note 12, at 103, 121. 
 21. David Luban has presented the best-developed version of this view. See DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 160 (1988). 
 22. See id. 
 23. The drive toward this kind of integration is explored at length more recently in DANIEL 
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 155-170 
(2008). 
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The solution that the moral philosophers offered made sense—that is, if 
you accept the assumptions about moral lawyers and cardboard clients 
on which it was based. 
If you take away the assumptions about moral lawyers and 
cardboard clients, there are some fairly obvious problems with this 
solution.24 If you assume that lawyers and clients are equally capable of 
sound moral decisionmaking, it does not make a lot of sense to give 
lawyers a moral veto over their clients’ decisions. After all, the decisions 
made in legal representation are going to affect the client’s life. There is 
no reason to believe that lawyers’ legal training gives them particular 
moral expertise. Our democratic system is based on the idea that we are 
a government of laws, not men—and that means clients should be able 
to pursue their objectives within the bounds of legitimate legal limits, 
not within the bounds of their lawyers’ moral compasses. And when you 
further consider that we live in a morally pluralistic society, 
characterized by fundamental moral disagreement over foundational 
values, the idea that the client’s affairs ought to be governed by the 
lawyer’s moral compass becomes even less defensible. 
I have previously explored the challenge of moral pluralism by 
positing a lawyer-client relationship between a lesbian couple who is 
preparing to have a child by insemination or adoption in a state that does 
not explicitly permit gay marriage or co-adoption, and a lawyer who 
believes that homosexuality is immoral and that it is damaging for 
children to be raised in a same-sex household.25 I created this example to 
critique the moral philosophers’ solution because if you take the 
lawyer’s point of view, the example has all the earmarks of the typical 
legal ethics hypothetical: a client who wants to do something immoral 
that threatens harm to an innocent third party and a legal context in 
which the lawyer has to push out to the arguable limits of the law to 
accomplish the client’s goals. But it is also quite clearly an example in 
which it is inappropriate for the client’s life decisions to be guided by 
the lawyer’s moral compass. I am going to return to this example later, 
but before I do that, I want to turn to a question that I hope you are 
asking yourself by now: isn’t there a better solution than what the moral 
philosophers offer us? 
 
 
 24. See TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION 
OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 89-99 (2009). 
 25. Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 389, 393, 408 (2005). 
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III. A DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS AND A DIFFERENT SOLUTION 
There is a better solution. In fact, there is a completely different 
way of diagnosing the problems of legal professionalism that lie at the 
core of the moral philosophers’ concerns. But to get there, you have to 
bring to mind a different image of clients. You have to imagine a client 
who walks into a lawyer’s office with a human problem or situation: she 
has been injured on the job, she wants to file for divorce, she has just 
fired an employee and has been sued for wrongful termination, or she 
wants to start a business and does not know what regulations or 
procedures apply to her. What the lawyer does—what the lawyer has 
been trained to do and has expertise in doing—is to sort the facts of that 
human problem or situation into a series of legal categories: claims, 
defenses, procedures, and evidentiary proof. The lawyer “issue-spots” 
the client in much the same way that law students learn to issue-spot 
facts in a law school exam. In the process of issue-spotting, the lawyer 
distills the legally relevant facts and determines what strategies and 
structures are legally available for pursuing the client’s objectives.26 
As a result of their legal professional training, lawyers have a 
tendency to over-value their clients' legal rights and interests relative to 
the weight that their clients might assign to the protection of those rights 
and interests when the clients compares them to the other things that the 
clients value. If a lawyer is not careful, a client’s human problem can 
disappear, and the client can appear instead as a bundle of legal rights 
and interests walking around in a human body. The client’s important 
non-legal interests—the client’s relationships with others, reputation and 
standing in the community, values, and commitments that the client 
wants to honor—can fade into the background as the client’s legal rights 
and interests come more sharply into focus. 
When we add to this picture the fact that protecting one’s own legal 
rights and interests almost always involves maximizing one’s own 
wealth, freedom, and power at the expense of others, we start to see 
something really interesting. We have criticized the moral philosophers 
for assuming that clients are just cardboard figures who want to take 
advantage of other people and are impervious to moral restraint. But 
now we see that in the practice of law and in the very process of 
employing legal expertise, lawyers are in danger of doing something 
 26. For further discussion of this diagnosis of the problem in legal professionalism, see 
Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1079-82 (1979); 
Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers’ Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 
183-85, 188-91 (1999); and William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ideology of Advocacy: 
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 53-55. 
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very similar. They are in danger of over-valuing their clients’ legal rights 
and interests and disregarding the other values, relationships, and 
commitments that clients bring to the table (what I have called the 
problem of legal objectification).27 And, from the outside, that can look 
a lot like zealously pursuing the interests of selfish, grasping clients to 
the limits of the la
Though they may look the same in terms of lawyer behavior, the 
problem of lawyers who legally issue-spot their clients is actually quite 
different from the problem of role morality as it was posed by the moral 
philosophers in both its diagnosis and in its solution. In the legal issue-
spotting diagnosis, we are not imagining that clients really are only 
interested in maximizing their wealth, freedom, and power—we are 
imagining that the lawyer’s preoccupation with the client’s legal rights 
and interests has caused the client’s other values to fade into the 
background. The solution is not to turn over moral control of the 
representation to the lawyer—it is to get lawyers to bring the client’s 
other interests and concerns back into the picture so that the legal 
representation can be directed toward objectives that put the pursuit of 
legal interests into the context of the client's other values, relationships, 
and concerns. 
What I have just described is the client-centered approach to 
lawyering that forms the centerpiece for most teaching about the 
professional skills of interviewing and counseling and is the established 
orthodoxy of most teaching that goes on within clinical legal 
education.28 The client-centered approach was developed in the mid-
1970s, during the same period of time that the moral philosophers in 
legal ethics were exploring conflicts between role morality and ordinary 
morality. The client-centered approach can be seen as addressing the 
same basic problematic behavior that the moral philosophers observed—
that lawyers are intent on pursuing their clients’ objectives, narrowly 
defined as the maximization of wealth, freedom, and power over others, 
all the way up to the arguable limits of the law. 
But the client-centered approach diagnoses the source of the 
problem differently and it offers a different solution. The moral 
philosophers diagnosed the problem as lawyers who were trapped within 
a professional role that bound them to the zealous pursuit of their clients’ 
interests and prevented them from exercising moral judgment. The 
 27. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 122-24. 
 28. For a more comprehensive discussion of client-centered representation, see generally 
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 
501 (1990); and Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
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client-centered approach diagnosed the problem as lawyers who 
distorted their clients’ objectives by over-valuing the clients’ legal 
interests and losing track of the clients’ non-legal interests. The solution 
that the client-centered approach offered was a broader range of lawyer 
deference to client decisionmaking on the theory that lawyers may be 
experts on the law, but only clients are experts on their own lives. 
I am a proponent of client-centered lawyering, both because I think 
it provides a better diagnosis of the problems in legal professionalism 
and because I think it offers a more attractive solution than the moral 
philosophers have offered us. It is more attractive because it allows us to 
re-introduce moral responsibility into legal representation by defining 
the duty of partisanship to include a responsibility to shape legal 
representation around a more robust and holistic understanding of client 
objectives. It provides a source of limitation on lawyers’ no-holds-barred 
partisanship that springs directly from lawyers’ professional duties to 
pursue their clients’ objectives, rather than from appeals to lawyers’ 
moral compasses that compete with professional duty and undermine the 
values of autonomy, dignity, equality, and the rule of law. But the 
question of what it means to be a good client-centered lawyer is a 
complicated one, and its applicability outside the context of individual 
client relationships is questionable. I will spend the rest of my time here 
exploring these complications and limitations in more detail. 
A. Engaged Client-Centered Representation 
When the client-centered approach to legal representation was first 
introduced in the lawyering skills literature, its methods were based on 
deference to client decisionmaking, techniques of neutral interviewing 
and counseling, and a philosophy of minimizing interference with client 
decisionmaking.29 The assumption implicit in these methods was that 
clients already knew what their objectives were, and that lawyers needed 
to take special care not to distort their clients’ objectives by expressing 
opinions about what the clients ought to do or even offer legal advice.30 
As the client-centered approach has become more sophisticated 
over time, most lawyering theorists have acknowledged that this kind of 
detachment and non-interference by the lawyer is not only unworkable, 
 29. See Dinerstein, supra note 28, at 507-09. 
 30. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: 
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 51-57 (1977). Later versions of this interviewing and counseling 
textbook have significantly modified this stark view. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS 
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 289 (2d ed. 2004) (“Client-centeredness does not 
require you to hide from giving advice . . . Client-centeredness encompasses the notion that as a 
matter of autonomy, clients who seek your help are entitled to ask for and receive advice.”). 
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but it is also undesirable.31 What has emerged instead are varying 
degrees of lawyer engagement in helping clients determine their 
objectives in light of the law and “in light of the clients’ own 
understandings of themselves, their relationships with others and the 
world and the clients’ evolving desires about what they want.”32 
Engaged client-centered representation recognizes that clients do not 
arrive with static and pre-determined objectives to which lawyers can 
simply defer. Clients’ objectives are tied to their feelings, relationships 
and experiences; their objectives often change over the course of 
representation; and their objectives are shaped in part by the information 
about the law and available legal options that their lawyers explain to 
them.33 
The basic guiding principle underlying client-centered 
representation is to value and enhance the client’s autonomy, both within 
the lawyer-client relationship and within society. Moral philosophers 
have criticized client autonomy as a basis for legal ethics, arguing that 
autonomy has no moral value in itself; that what has moral value is what 
people do with their autonomy.34 However, this criticism equates 
“‘autonomy’” with “doing whatever [you] want” in the moment.35 
Ironically, it is from the field of moral philosophy that we get a much 
deeper and richer version of what autonomy means, which can help 
guide lawyers past the neutral and non-interventionist roots of client-
centered lawyering and into the nuances of an engaged client-centered 
approach to determining their client’s objectives. 
The word “‘autonomy’” means, quite literally, “‘self-rule,’”36 and 
philosophers have understood it to encompass both the “negative” 
freedom to be free from the interference of others, and the “positive” 
freedom to grow, discover, evolve and flourish in one’s own way.37 
 31. One of the earliest and most comprehensive critics of this view was Stephen Ellmann. See 
generally Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992); Stephen 
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987). For an overview of the different kinds 
of critiques of lawyer neutrality that have emerged within the client-centered lawyering theory 
literature, see Kruse, supra note 28, at 385-399. 
 32. STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING 
AND COUNSELING 7 (2009). 
 33. See id. at 6-7, 23. 
 34. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 638-39. 
 35. David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy 
Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 826 (arguing against both this popular conception and a 
more sophisticated Kantian notion of self-rule). 
 36. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 286 n.19 (2003). 
 37. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 123-34 
(1969). 
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Joseph Raz described the ability to define and become the person one 
wants to be over the course of one’s lifetime in terms of “authorship” of 
one’s own life.38 Under this more expansive view, one’s autonomy—the 
ability to be the author of one’s own life—can be constrained in a 
number of different ways. One’s autonomy can be frustrated by external 
forces or conditions that create a lack of meaningful choice in the 
world.39 One’s ability to be the person one wants to be can also be 
defeated by succumbing to fleeting desires.40 The story of Odysseus, 
who commanded his crew to tie him to the mast of his ship so that he 
will not be tempted by the call of the Sirens is a classic example used by 
philosophers to explain how interfering with what someone wants to do 
in the moment may actually enhance their autonomy by preserving their 
fidelity to their own deeper-seated values.41 
However, we are not often like Odysseus in knowing and being 
able to articulate what our deepest-seated values are and requesting help 
in staying true to them. Living a life in accordance with our values is 
likely to be a process that unfolds over time. Our deepest values are 
often opaque and come clear to us only through the process of making 
choices over time. Our values are diverse and likely to be internally 
inconsistent, forcing us to prioritize and choose between them as we 
move through life. It is through practical choices made in situations of 
value conflict or confusion that we are likely to discover, articulate, and 
actualize the kind of persons we want to be. 
Legal representation is often a site for those kinds of practical 
choices that bring deeper-seated values to light. Because the situations 
that lead clients to seek legal representation often involve disruptions or 
threats to the status quo, plans for the future, or responses to new 
opportunities, clients’ legal issues are often entangled with deeper 
values, projects, commitments, and relationships with others. Engaged 
client-centered representation recognizes that in pursuing a client’s 
objectives in legal representation, lawyers are doing much more than 
simply taking “hired gun” marching orders from their clients. To 
determine what the client’s objectives are, lawyers often engage their 
clients in a process of value clarification that includes techniques of 
active listening and probing beneath the surface of a client’s stated 
wishes to ensure that what the client says he wants is consistent with the 
client’s other values and to ensure that the decisions made by the client 
 38. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 155, 369 (1986). 
 39. Id. at 372-74. 
 40. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 14-15 (1988). 
 41. See id. 
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in the moment will stand the test of time as the client’s situation 
changes. 
The touchstone for engaged client-centered representation is to 
shape legal representation around the client's own values. This attention 
to client values strikes a middle ground between the “hired gun” 
approach of neutral non-interference and thicker notions of the lawyer-
client relationship proposed by some legal ethicists. Some legal ethicists 
have argued that the ideal lawyer-client relationship should be like a 
friendship, in which lawyers and clients mutually strive for goodness as 
they collaborate in addressing the moral issues that inevitably arise in 
legal representation. Legal representation, they argue, should be a moral 
give-and-take between lawyers and clients in which both lawyers and 
clients try to make each other better persons.42 This view of the lawyer-
client relationship as this kind of friendship aims beyond helping a client 
articulate the client’s objectives according to the client’s own values and 
seeks to morally educate the client. 
In my view, these thicker notions of the lawyer-client relationship 
as a friendship or mutual search for the good are both unrealistic and 
inappropriate goals for legal representation. Clients retain lawyers 
because lawyers have legal expertise. Lawyers are also people with the 
same moral expertise as anyone else. Clients may seek moral counsel 
from their lawyers, just as they might from their teachers, dentists, or 
plumbers. But in choosing a lawyer, clients typically do not have the 
personal information that we rely on when we turn to friends for moral 
guidance, such as whether they share our values or have the life 
experience to understand our dilemmas or empathize with our 
struggles.43 Moral insight may come from a client’s process of clarifying 
his values in legal representation and moral advice may be incidental to 
that process. However, moral instruction—like moral control—is an 
inappropriate goal for lawyers to have in the lawyer-client relationship. 
With these principles in mind, let’s go back to Spaulding, the 
personal injury case in which the defendant’s doctor discovered that the 
plaintiff was likely suffering from an aortic aneurysm, which may have 
been caused by the automobile accident. The defendant did not reveal 
this fact to the plaintiff, a choice that eventually led the court to set aside 
the judgment based on the parties’ settlement.44 In 1998, Roger Cramton 
and Lori Knowles investigated the decades-old facts of this professional 
responsibility classic by combing through court records and interviewing 
 42. For the most prominent articulation of this view, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. 
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46-50 (2d ed. 2009). 
 43. See DARE, supra note 24, at 92. 
 44. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710-11 (Minn. 1962). 
590 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:577 
                                                          
lawyers, judges, and surviving family members.45 Based on their 
investigation, it appears likely that the defendant’s lawyer, who was paid 
by an insurance company, pushed the case through to settlement without 
ever consulting his client about whether to reveal the information about 
the life-threatening medical condition to the plaintiff.46 Doing so served 
the legal and financial interests of both the client and the insurance 
company, who may have been liable for greater damages if the more 
serious condition had come to light. 
But was it consistent with the long-term values, relationships, and 
commitments of the defendant, John Zimmerman? The Zimmermans 
and the Spauldings were neighbors in rural Minnesota, and twenty-year-
old David Spaulding (the plaintiff) worked together with nineteen-year-
old John Zimmerman (the defendant) in the Zimmerman’s road 
construction business.47 The automobile accident occurred at dusk when 
the car driven by John Zimmerman, who was transporting employees of 
his father’s road construction business home at the end of the day, 
collided with a car occupied by the Ledermann family on their way 
home from the county fair.48 It was a tragic event for all three families 
involved. In addition to seriously injuring David Spaulding, the accident 
killed twelve-year-old Elaine Ledermann and John Zimmerman’s 
brother James, and broke the neck of John Zimmerman’s father, 
Edward.49 
Given the close relationships in a tight-knit community and the 
devastating losses that his own family had already suffered, it is quite 
likely that John Zimmerman would have consented to reveal medical 
information critically important to David Spaulding’s life and health. 
That is, if his lawyer had cared about representing his legal interests 
within the context of his other values. This is an important point, in no 
small part because the stripped-down facts of Spaulding have been used 
for so many years in legal ethics to create a moral dilemma for David 
Zimmerman’s lawyer: What do you do when your client insists on 
keeping potentially life-saving information confidential?50 The case is 
only rarely used to point to the need for lawyers to consult their clients 
rather than assuming that their clients will want to maximize their legal 
 45. Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: 
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 63 n.2 (1998). 
 46. See id. at 69-70. 
 47. Id. at 63-64. 
 48. Id. at 64. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 21, at 179 (describing Spaulding as an example of a situation 
in which “lawyers may be required by the duty of confidentiality silently to permit the ruination of 
innocent third parties”). 
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and financial interests at the expense of others.51 And those kinds of 
assumptions, which limit legal representation to a client’s narrowly-
defined legal interests, are the kind of problems that engaged client-
centered representation is designed to address. 
B. The Limits and Possibilities of an Engaged Client-Centered Theory 
of Legal Ethics 
Are there limits to engaged client-centered representation? I think 
there are, and I want to mention two of them. One limit is raised by the 
lesbian family planning example I alluded to earlier, where the lesbian 
couple goes to a lawyer to get advice on how to use existing law to 
structure their family affairs so that their child can enjoy a family 
relationship that best approximates the kind of relationship the child 
would have if they were legally able to marry.52 Because we are 
imagining that the law does not permit same-sex marriage or co-
adoption in their state, the law only imperfectly captures what the couple 
wants to do. It may come as a surprise to the clients that they cannot 
simply replicate a legal family out of existing legal structures. In making 
legal decisions in light of that information, the couple may be forced to 
confront their deeper values about trust, loyalty, and family as they 
consider how they feel about having legally asymmetrical relationships 
with a child who cannot be co-adopted and what to do about the possible 
parental rights of the child’s biological father. If the lawyer in that 
scenario believes strongly that what the clients are doing is morally 
wrong and damaging to the child, it may be difficult for the lawyer to 
take the clients through a sensitive and probing discussion of how to 
pursue their available legal options in ways that honor their deeper 
values, individually and as a couple. 
In such circumstances, it can be difficult for the lawyer to achieve 
the empathy required to put oneself in the client’s shoes and understand 
the value trade-offs from the client’s point of view. The very task of 
finding ways within the law to structure a non-traditional family may be 
experienced by the lawyer as a betrayal of his own ideals, a betrayal of 
community values, or a threat to his own identity. To the extent that the 
lawyer strays outside the stable confines of pure legal interest-based 
advice and counseling and enters a broader conversation about the 
 51. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the 
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1606-07 (1995) (describing the facts 
as a missed opportunity for client counseling). 
 52. The lesbian family planning example is discussed more fully in Kruse, supra note 25, at 
408-11. 
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clients’ values, he is likely to find himself in a moral conflict of interest 
where his personal values and commitments materially limit his nuanced 
exploration of his client’s options. The temptation for the lawyer in such 
a situation is to avoid the conflict by detaching emotionally and viewing 
the situation logically within the confines of maximizing the client’s 
legal interests. 
A lawyer in Tennessee found himself in this type of situation.53 He 
petitioned to be taken off the appointment list for representing girls 
seeking judicial bypasses of parental consent for abortion because of his 
own beliefs about assisting what he viewed as the termination of a 
human life impaired his ability to fully counsel his clients.54 Full 
counseling, in his view, included advising them to talk to their parents or 
to seek alternatives to abortion.55 The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
responded that the lawyer’s moral commitments were not a compelling 
reason to be relieved of court-appointed duty, saying that the lawyer 
must set aside his moral views and represent his clients’ legal interests 
impartially.56 As we broaden our ideas about competent legal 
representation to include engaged client-centered counseling that goes 
beyond advice about legal interests, we are calling on lawyers to 
exercise a broader range of problem-solving skills than merely legal 
reasoning and analysis, and we must recognize the limits that moral 
conflicts of interest may set on the deployment of those broader skills. 
Second, we must be attuned to the difficulties that inhere in 
translating the vision of engaged client-centered lawyering into contexts 
where clients’ objectives and values are difficult to ascertain through 
methods of self-reflection and value clarification. Two particular 
contexts spring to mind. One is the situation of diminished-capacity 
clients—children, adolescents, or elderly clients—whose ability to 
engage in value clarification may be limited.57 The other is the situation 
of entity clients like corporations, where the “real” client is not a human 
being at all, but is instead a legal fiction. The methods of engaged client-
centered representation—active listening and probing the client to more 
deeply explore the client’s legal options within a framework of the 
client’s own values—are of limited utility in such circumstances. 
 53. See Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Op. 96-F-140, at 1 
(1996). 
 54. See id. at 1, 3. 
 55. See id. at 1-2. 
 56. See id. at 3-5. 
 57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2007) (model rule for “Client with 
Diminished Capacity”). 
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However, I would argue that engaged client-centered representation 
is still valuable in defining an ideal toward which a lawyer ought to 
strive in these contexts. When the client’s values are less than fully 
developed, where the client is unable to articulate them, or where the 
client is not a human being at all, the lawyer may be tempted to revert to 
one of two extremes. One temptation is to return to legal interest-based 
representation that views client objectives only in terms of maximizing 
the client’s wealth, freedom, and power over others. This is a safe 
default choice to take in the absence of knowing that the client has 
competing values. But this takes us right back to kind of legal interests-
based counseling that engaged client-centered representation is designed 
to avoid. The other is for a lawyer to impose her own values on 
representation in the guise of substituted judgment, by assuming that the 
client’s values are consistent with the lawyer’s values. But this returns us 
to the role of the lawyer as a moral director of the client's affairs. 
In the area of diminished-capacity representation, lawyering 
theorists who teach in clinics that represent children, elderly persons 
suffering from dementia, or mentally impaired clients, have been carving 
out a kind of solution that avoids each of these extremes.58 Lawyering 
theorists in this area suggest that lawyers should strive to make decisions 
that represent the client’s unique values to the extent that those values 
can be ascertained and separated from the lawyer’s values. Elderly 
clients may be impaired in decisionmaking, but they have a lifetime of 
choices in other contexts that reflect and reveal their values. Children 
may have insufficient life experience to have fully-formed values, but 
they have a set of preferences on which a lawyer can draw to infer 
deeper values that are unique to them. 
In the corporate context, the discussion has been dominated by 
legal ethicists who propose variations on the moral lawyering solutions, 
urging lawyers to act as “lawyer-statesmen” taking a leadership role in 
helping their clients develop a sense of social responsibility or by 
defenders of the stark view of lawyers as hired guns. There has been less 
attention to how a third path between these extremes might be carved.59 
The legal ethical discussion in the corporate client context would be 
enriched by considering what it might mean to approximate an approach 
 58. For an excellent discussion of the challenges of client-centered lawyering in these 
contexts, see generally Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed 
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996); and 
Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably 
Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515. 
 59. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 118-22; Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue 
State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1339, 1356-57 (2006). 
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that sought out the values of an entity client. Corporations are not human 
beings that experience value conflict, continuity, and clarification over 
time and through experience. However, they usually have a mission, a 
corporate culture, and a public reputation from which values can be 
derived. Legal ethicists have a tendency to swoop in after the fact, 
survey the ruins of a scandal like Enron and ask: Where were the 
lawyers who failed to prevent this harm to the public from occurring?60 
The result is a renewed call for lawyers to step into the breach and 
provide moral direction in legal representation to a morally wayward 
corporate client. What tends to get overlooked is that the lawyers in 
those scandals were not being very good partisan representatives 
either.61 Enron, after all, did not triumph from its misdeeds—it 
collapsed. However, I suspect that despite the headline grabbing 
scandals, many lawyers who represent entity clients engage in thoughtful 
exploration with their clients to discover what is in their client’s long-
term interests in ways that approximate client value clarification.62 
I began this talk with the story of the beginning of theoretical legal 
ethics as we know it today, suggesting that it grew out of thoughtful 
conversations among lawyers about what it meant to be a good lawyer, 
and sought to articulate the theoretical foundations and justifications for 
good practice. Much of the client-centered lawyering theory grows 
similarly out of the experience of practice, and is produced by scholars 
embedded in the project of teaching students how to be reflective about 
practice experience. I want to end by saying that I hope that legal ethics 
can make itself relevant to corporate practice in much the same way. 
Rather than endlessly replaying headline grabbing scandals, my hope is 
that legal ethicists will go out in search of the lawyers who quietly 
exercise good judgment in the day-to-day representation of entity clients, 
seek to understand their practices, and build a foundation of theory that 
articulates and supports those practices. 
 60. This question has been traced to the comments made in the savings and loan crisis of the 
1980s, which “has become a convenient shorthand used by scholars of the legal profession who 
believe . . . that lawyers have failed to take seriously their responsibility as professionals while 
representing wealthy corporate clients.” See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1167-68 (2005). 
 61. See, e.g., William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional 
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1459-60, 1464-67 (2006). 
 62. There is some support for this conclusion in an empirical study of the ethical practices of 
large firm litigators. See Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics 
in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 844-46 (1998) (discussing corporate lawyers’ 
appeals to client reputation not merely as a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis, but as a way of 
“providing a social looking-glass that allows one . . . to see and judge oneself”). 
